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After its biggest loss of support ever (6.2 percentage points), the CDU/CSU was left with their smallest share of the vote since 1949 at 35.2 per cent. By contrast, the SPD enjoyed its largest increase ever (4.5 percentage points) and became, at 40.9 per cent, the strongest party in the Bundestag for only the second time since 1972 (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1998). A parallel with Labour's landslide victory in May 1997 under Tony Blair naturally comes to mind. And yet it was not only the scenes of jubilation comparable with those in London's Downing Street on 2 May 1997 that were missing from the streets of Bonn and Berlin.
2 The more time passed after the federal election, the clearer it became that -despite pre-election vows to the contrary and subsequent attempts to appear as birds of the same feather (Blair/Schroeder 1999) -there remain substantial differences between Blair's New Labour and Schroeder's New Centre or Neue Mitte. What explains these differences? And what are the prospects that the Neue Mitte will move beyond a campaign slogan and become a real programme of progressive government?
These are the questions we address in this chapter. First, in section 2, we chart and explain the shifts in the SPD's political strategy during its period in opposition. In section 3, we outline some key features of the German party and political systems which must be taken into account in any realistic assessment of prospects for reform and in any realistic comparison of the SPD under Schroeder with the position of New Labour under Tony Blair. Section 4 explains how differences in institutional contexts between the two countries made for very different degrees of programmatic reform S. White (ed.), New Labourin these two parties during their respective years of opposition, and how the SPD was accordingly obliged to adopt a different, and fundamentally ambiguous, strategy for communicating change in the party (or the appearance of change) to the electorate. One of the main challenges now facing the new Schroeder government is to resolve the 'crisis of inactivity' in the German welfare state. Having explained the basic nature of the problem in section 5, in section 6 we discuss the prospects for reform in this area. Given the various constraints posed by the party and political systems, as explained in the earlier sections of the chapter, we conclude that at present the prospects for fundamental reform are poor. We conclude, in section 7, with some speculations on possible future developments of the Neue Mitte government.
The uncertain strategy of the SPD in opposition
The Labour Party's dominance of the centre-left of British politics was challenged in the 1980s by the SDP/Liberal Alliance, a force to its right. By contrast, the SPD was confronted with an emergent party to its left, namely the Green Party, a development that signalled the appearance of a new 'postmaterialist' cleavage in the West German party system.
3 This put the SPD at a severe strategic disadvantage. With a portion of their vote moving to the Greens, the Social Democrats lost their capacity to form a winning twoparty coalition (with the exception of a 'grand coalition' with the CDU).
Three responses were open to the SPD in this new situation. First, it could try to reintegrate the groups of the New Left which centred mainly around so-called post-materialist issues like ecology and peace; secondly, it could focus, and try to broaden its appeal, on its old materialist core issues (jobs, welfare and so on); thirdly, it could seek a division of labour with the Greens with the aim of forming a coalition with them. During its 16 years in opposition, the SPD tried all three strategies and switched uncertainly between them.
The SPD first tried to integrate the post-materialist left. It revised its defence policy and, in 1986, rejected nuclear power. It advocated a socalled reconciliation between labour and the environment so as to bridge the gap between the unions and the partisans of the 'new politics'. But the latter half of the 1980s also saw an attempt by the 'old' SPD under Rau to emphasize the concerns of the trade unions and the interests of old industries such as steel and coal. At the same time, the 'new' SPD under Lafontaine launched a discussion around economic modernization characterized by calculated attacks on the trade unions and their perceived immobility. 4 While gaining a lot of publicity, however, Lafontaine did not move the SPD's economic programme beyond an emphasis on shortening of work hours. Meanwhile, the party laboriously sought a replacement for the 'Godesberg' programme of 1959. It finished this work in December 1989
